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Social Traps and
Environmental Policy
Why do problems persist when there are
technical solutions available?
Robert Costanza

I

n recent years scientific understanding and public awareness of
environmental problems have increased tremendously. Yet our ability
to manage these problems effectively
has in too many cases gotten worse,
not better. Consider the following
examples:

By studying real-world
social traps and
laboratory examples, we
can learn effective escapes

• Thousands of inactive and abandoned hazardous waste dumps exist . ing in the coastal zone has been
in the United States. There are thou- shown to be a significant contributing
sands more active sites, plus deep well factor to wetland erosion (along with
injection sites. These wastes are slow- sediment diversion resulting from levly seeping into drinking water sup- eeing the Mississippi River and natuplies; many of their constituent chem- ral subsidence) (Craig et al. 1979,
icals have totally unknown effects on Deegan et al. 1984, Leibowitz et al.
human and environmental health. 1987, Scaife et al. 1983). In 1980 the
Each year thousands of new chemi- state implemented an office of coastal
cals are introduced into the environ- zone management to permit canal
ment whose effects are equally un- dredging and other activities in the
known . Superfund is only beginning coastal zone. Since 1980 there have
to clean up the worst inactive and been several thousand canal-dredging
abandoned sites (most of the money applications (mainly for the developso far has gone into planning and ment of oil and gas), and the office
litigation). Handling active sites is has yet to deny a permit. Some smalllargely an individual state's responsi- scale projects designed to reverse wetbility, and resources for this critical land erosion have been implemented
task are too often insufficient.
but have been largely ineffective. The
• The coastal zone of Louisiana is state is currently considering several
eroding at a rate of more than 100 options to control the erosion of
km2/yr, and the rate is accelerating wetland, all of which will be very
(Gagliano et al. 1981). Canal dredg- expensive .
• Probably the biggest environmental threat facing the world today is the
Robert Costanza is an associate professor threat of nuclear war. The likelihood
at the Coastal Ecology Institute, Center that a nuclear winter will result from
for Wetland Resources, Louisiana State even a moderate thermonuclear exUniversity, Baton Rouge, LA 70803. His
change has been estimated by some
research interests include systems ecology,
landscape ecology, ecological modeling, researchers to be very high (Turco et
energy analysis, ecological economics and al. 1983, White and London 1984).
management, game theory, and peace There is still considerable uncertainty
studies. © 1987 American Institute of about the global environmental efBiological Sciences.
fects of nuclear war. Even in the best-

case scenario the damages would be
astronomical, and in the worst case
such an event could drive the human
species to extinction. It would be catastrophic not only for human life, but
for most forms of life on the planet
(Ehrlich et al. 1983). There has, however, been little real movement toward arms control or other long-term
solutions.
This litany could be continued indefinitely, spanning the spectrum
from local to global problems (see
also Borman and Likens, p. 370, and
Catton, p. 413, this issue). The fundamental question is: Why do these
problems persist in the face of adequate scientific understanding of their
nature and of technical methods to
solve them? What do they have in
common? Can they be solved, and if
so is there a general category of
solutions?
I argue that all the environmental
problems mentioned above (and
many other social problems) belong
to a category of phenomenon called
social traps (Platt 1973). Like animal
traps, social traps lead an unwary
victim into the jaws of disaster with a
tempting bit of bait, and, once the
victim is caught, make escape extremely difficult. By studying the features real-world social traps have in
common, and by experimenting with
some simple laboratory examples of
social traps, we can learn more about
their general nature and the nature of
effective escapes from them. A broad
ecological perspective can be effective
in understanding, avoiding, and escaping from some social traps, but it
must be coupled with effective public
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Figure 1. Social traps as misleading road signs and some potential solutions.

policy. Effective policy involves a
range of activities from education to
regulation to correcting the misleading short-term incentives (the bait)
that create traps in the first place.

Social traps
A social trap is any situation in which
the short-run, local reinforcements
guiding individual behavior are inconsistent with the long-run, global
best interest of the individual and
society (Cross and Guyer 1980, Platt
1973, Teger 1980). We go through life
making decisions about which path to
take based largely on "road signs,"
the short-run, local reinforcements
that we perceive most directly. These
short-run reinforcements can include
monetary incentives, social accept-

ance or admonishment, and physical
pleasure or pain. Figure 1a indicates
the situation. In this figure the "correct" path (toward happiness and
prosperity) seems obvious from the
signs. In general, this strategy of following the road signs is quite effective
in getting us where we want to go.
Problems arise, however, when the
road signs are inaccurate or misleading. In these cases we can be trapped
into following a path that is ultimately detrimental because of our reliance
on the road signs. For example, cigarette smoking is a social trap because
by following the short-run road signs
of the pleasure and social status associated with smoking, we embark on
the road to an increased risk of earlier
death from smoking-induced cancer.
More important, once this road has

been taken it is very difficult to
change to another (as most people
who have tried to quit smoking can
attest) .
Social traps can result from several
causes. Table 1 is a taxonomy of these
causes (Cross and Guyer 1980) along
with some representative traps associated with each. Cigarette smoking,
for example, is mainly a time-delay
trap resulting from the fact that the
positive and negative reinforcements
are separated in time.
Traps can also arise out of simple
ignorance of the relevant reinforcements, the change of reinforcements
with time (sliding reinforcer traps),
the externalization of some important
reinforcements from the accounting
system (externality traps), the actions
of some individuals affecting the
group in adverse ways (collective
traps), or a combination of these
causes (hybrid traps). These causes
will be elaborated in the examples
that follow.
Social traps are ubiquitous in everyday life and have become the basis
for some important social psychology
research (Brockner and Rubin 1985).
For example, the "prisoner's dilemma" game is a famous externality
trap that has been used recently to
study the conditions under which
cooperation can evolve (Axelrod
1984). In this game two players must
each choose either to cooperate or
defect. If they both cooperate, they
both reap a moderate reward (say
three units each) . If they both defect
they both get a much smaller reward
(say one unit each). If one cooperates
while the other defects, the cooperator gets nothing (the "sucker's payoff") while the defector gets a reward
larger than that for mutual cooperation (say five units). Under these
conditions, if the players only meet
once and cannot communicate with
each other, the optimum strategy is to
defect. For if one has no information
about the other player, one must assume the worst to avoid the sucker's
payoff. The situation changes radically if the game is played several times
with the same participants. Then each
player has the record of their opponent's past behavior, and the optimum strategy is not obvious.
Axelrod (1984) held a computer
tournament pitting various submitted
strategies against one another in a
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round robin tournament of the iterated prisoner's dilemma. He found that
a simple strategy called tit for tat,
which cooperates on the first move,
then does whatever its opponent did
last time, won the tournament. In the
iterated prisoner's dilemma, one can
fall into the always-defect trap by not
looking beyond the current move. If a
strategy is too shortsighted it misses
the opportunity to reap the benefits of
mutual cooperation. Tit for tat was
only a little more farsighted (one
move) than all defect, but this was
enough to dramatically improve its
performance without making it too
susceptible to being suckered.
It turns out that there are several
other strategies that would have won
the tournament had they been entered. One of these cooperates on the
first move and then looks at the entire
past history of its opponent's moves
to generate a time-weighted expected
value for the opponent's next move.
A strategy almost identical to this
(called downing) was entered but lost
because it defected on the first two
moves. In the iterated prisoner's dilemma, it pays to assume the best of
your opponent (at least until you have
been proven wrong) and to have a
good memory.
The tragedy of the commons is
another well-known social trap used
to study overexploitation of natural
resources (Hardin 1968). The classic
commons trap goes something like
this. There is a common property
resource (say grazing land). Each individual user (rancher) sees his individual cost for consuming an additional unit of the resource (adding
one more animal) as small and constant, and much less than the private
benefits (from selling an animal).
However, the overall cost to all the
users of each additional resource unit
consumed (animal added) increases
exponentially as the resource is
stressed. Eventually, one additional
animal (which costs its owner no
more than the first) leads to the destruction of the resource (which costs
the animal's owner and the rest of the
ranchers tremendously). The tragedy
of the commons is a collective trap
that occurs because the costs and
benefits apparent to the individual are
inconsistent with the costs and benefits to the collective society.
Edney and Harper (1978) experi-

Table 1. A short taxonomy of social traps (Cross and Guyer 1980).
Cause of trap

Examples

Time delay
Ignorance
Sliding reinforcer
Externality
Collective
Hybrid

Discounting, smoking, drug addiction in general
Slot machines, gambler'S fallacy
Pesticide overuse
Pollution, prisoner's dilemma
Tragedy of the commons

men ted with a simple game designed
to test people's behavior in a commons game. In this game a pool of
resources is represented by poker
chips. The resource pool is renewable; it is replenished after each round
in proportion to the number of chips
left in the common pool. The objective for each player is to accumulate
as many chips as possible from the
common pool. At each round, players
can take either one, two, or three
chips. If all players take three chips
per round, the resource pool is quickly depleted, and the players end up
with far fewer chips than if they had
all taken only one chip per round,
since doing so would have allowed
the resource pool to replenish itself.
This game is a trap (and a good
analogy for many real-world common-property resource problems) because the short-term, narrow incentives (to take as many chips as
possible each round) are inconsistent
with the long-term incentives (to accumulate as many chips as possible by
the end of the game).

Escaping social traps
Cross and Guyer (1980) list four
broad methods by which traps can be
avoided or escaped. These are education (about the long-term, distributed
impacts); insurance; superordinate
authority (i.e., legal systems, government, and religion); and converting
the trap to a trade-off (i.e., correcting
the road signs). Figures 1b-1d illustrate these methods using the road
sign analogy.
Education can be used to warn
people of long-term impacts that cannot be seen from the road (Figure 1b).
Examples are the warning labels now
required on cigarette packages and
the warnings of environmentalists
about future hazardous waste problems. People can ignore warnings,
however, particularly if the path

seems otherwise enticing (e.g., warning labels on cigarette packages have
had little effect on the number of
smokers).
The main problem with education
as a general method of avoiding and
escaping traps is that it requires a
significant time commitment on the
part of individuals to learn the details
of each situation. Our current society
is so large and complex that we cannot expect even environmental professionals, much less the entire voting
public, to know the details of all the
extant environmental traps. For education to be effective in avoiding traps
involving many individuals, all the
participants must be educated. For
example, in the renewable resource
game mentioned earlier if anyone of
the players starts taking three chips
per round the others must follow suit.
If anyone player consumes three
chips per round, the other players will
do individually worse by restricting
their consumption to one per round
than if they consume three per round.
The trap can only be avoided if all the
players restrict their consumption to
one chip per round, which requires
that they all are educated about the
nature of the trap.
The superordinate authority approach to avoiding social traps is
illustrated in Figure 1c. Governments
can forbid or regulate certain actions
that have been deemed socially inappropriate. The problem with this approach is that it must be rigidly monitored and enforced, and the strong
short-term incentive for individuals to
try to ignore or avoid the regulations
remains. A police force and legal system are very expensive to maintain,
and increasing their chances of catching violators increases their costs exponentially (both the costs of maintaining a larger, better-equipped force
and the cost of the loss of individual
privacy).
Religion can be seen as a much less
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expensive way to avoid certain social
traps. If a moral code of action and
belief in an ultimate payment for
transgressions can be deeply instilled
in a person, the probability of that
person's falling into the "sins" (traps)
covered by the code will be greatly
reduced, and with very little enforcement cost. On the other hand, there
are problems with religion as a means
to avoid social traps. The moral code
must be relatively static to allow beliefs learned early in life to remain in
force later. And it requires a relatively
homogeneous community of likeminded believers for religion to be
truly effective. This system works well
in culturally homogeneous societies
that are changing very slowly. In
modern, heterogeneous, rapidly
changing societies, religion cannot
handle all the newly evolving situations, nor the conflict between radically different cultures and belief
systems.
A trap may be changed to a tradeoff by imposing compensatory fees
(Figure 1d). Many theorists believe
that this method is the most effective
in avoiding and escaping from social
traps because it does not run counter
to our normal tendency to follow the
road signs; it merely corrects the
signs' inaccuracies by adding compensatory positive or negative
reinforcements.
A simple example illustrates how
effective this method can be. Playing
slot machines is a social trap because
the long-term costs and benefits are
inconsistent with the short-term costs
and benefits (Cross and Guyer 1980).
People play the machines because
they expect a large short-term jackpot, while the machines are in fact
programmed to payoff, say, $0.80 on
the dollar in the long term. People
may "win" hundreds of dollars playing the slots in the short run, but if
they play long enough they will certainly lose $0.20 for every dollar
played. To change this trap to a tradeoff, one could simply reprogram the
machines so that every time a dollar
was put in $0.80 would come out.
This way the short-term reinforcements ($0.80 on the dollar) are made
consistent with the long-term reinforcements ($0.80 on the dollar), and
only the dedicated aficionados of
spinning wheels with fruit painted on
them would continue to play.

lay, ignorance, externality, and collective traps. The negative environmental effects of hazardous waste do
not become evident until long after
they are produced (time delay); their
ultimate effects are largely unknown
at the time of their production and
release into the environment (ignorance); the negative effects are borne
by parties other than the producer
without sufficient compensation (externality); and common property resources are consumed (i.e., groundwater contamination) by individual
agents who do not bear the costs of
that consumption. The current regulatory approaches to hazardous waste
management will not be discussed
Traps and
here.
environmental policy
To turn this trap into a trade-off
Our approach in the United States to one must charge the producers of
avoiding and escaping environmental hazardous waste for the ultimate
traps has been mainly education and long-run environmental and health
governmental regulation (Figures 1b costs of these wastes, and the charges
and 1c). Although these methods are must be imposed at the time of the
essential elements in the overall pic- waste's production. Superfund can be
ture, they may not be the most effec- seen as a small step in the right directive means available in some situa- tion, but it relates only to the cleanup
tions. Converting traps to trade-offs of abandoned hazardous waste sites,
seems to be a more effective method is assessed long after the wastes are
in many experimental trap situations, produced, and is severely underfundbut it has been little used in the ed for the task.
The ignorance component of the
environmental area. In terms of environmental management, converting hazardous waste management trap is
traps to trade-offs implies determin- the most difficult to deal with. How
ing the long-run, distributed costs of can we charge producers of hazardenvironmentally hazardous activities ous wastes for the ultimate long-run
and charging those costs to the re- costs of their waste if we have no idea
sponsible parties in the short run. what (if any) those costs will actually
Pollution taxes are the best-known be? Part of the problem is that this
example of this approach (and they ignorance and uncertainty about fuhave been quite effective in the few ture costs is itself a cost, or more
cases in which they have been tried), precisely a risk of unknown magnibut it is possible to extend it to a tude. The trap exists in large part
much broader range of environmental because the producers of the hazardproblems. Below I give examples of ous waste do not bear this risk in the
how this approach might be applied short-run, but pass it on to the generto three critical current problems: al population and future generations.
One way to solve this problem inhazardous waste management, coastal wetland management, and the nu- volves changing our concepts of innoclear arms race. I do not imply that cence and guilt as they apply to industhis approach should be used inde- trial products. As in our criminal
pendently of education, insurance, justice system, there is currently a
and regulation, but as an adjunct that tacit presumption of "innocent until
can make the entire system more proven guilty" for chronic effects,
particularly those that are difficult to
effective.
quantify. The effect of smoking on
Hazardous waste management lung cancer is a case in point; cigarettes had been presumed innocent
The hazardous waste management until the overwhelming weight of eviproblem can be viewed as a hybrid dence proved them guilty. Although
trap containing elements of time-de- such presumption of innocence is toIn terms of Edney and Harper's
common property resource consumption game, one could turn the trap
into a trade-off by taxing any consumption above the optimum level
for resource stability. For example, if
players took two or three chips they
could be taxed one or two chips respectively, so that the short-term
benefits of taking more than one chip
were offset by short-term costs. This
would remove the short-term incentive to take more than one chip and
make the long- and short-term incentives in the game consistent, thereby
eliminating the trap.
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tally appropriate for persons charged
with crimes, it is not appropriate for
hazardous or potentially hazardous
materials, which we should instead
presume guilty until proven innocent.
Thus, to turn the hazardous waste
trap into a trade-off, we could charge
producers of potentially harmful substances the worst-case costs. By
worst-case we mean our current best
estimate of the largest potential damages, although future information
may later be used to increase the
worst-case costs. This money could
be put into a trust fund that would be
returned to the producer (with interest) if and when the waste is proved to
be innocuous, or could be used to
compensate for damages caused by
the waste if and when they become
apparent. This procedure would
change the short-term incentive structure from one that discourages waste
producers from doing research on
harmful effects, to one that encourages these studies so that some of the
trust fund monies could be returned.
The incentives to eliminate ignorance
about hazardous waste effects would
increase. It would also discourage
production of large quantities of
chemicals whose negative effects are
unknown by making them as expensive in the short run as their risk cost
to society.

Coastal wetland management
The problem of coastal wetland management is another example of a complex hybrid trap, with time-delay, ignorance, and collective elements.
Coastal erosion in Louisiana is a particularly severe example. Canal
dredging and other hydrologically
disruptive activities have contributed
to a current land loss rate of over 100
km 2 /yr (Craig et al. 1979, Gagliano et
al. 1981, Scaife et al. 1983). It may
already be too late to arrest or reverse
this trend. The situation is a trap
because the narrow, short-term incentives of those damaging the wetlands
are inconsistent with the long-term
good of the system.
To turn this trap into a trade-off,
one should charge the responsible
parties, at the time the damage-causing action is taken, the full cost of the
ultimate environmental damage. To
do this one needs to know the economic value to society of coastal

marshes and the amount of marsh
destroyed by each activity. As with
the hazardous waste issue, there is
much uncertainty involved in these
estimates, but the worst-case costs
should be assumed, and the burden of
proof that the damages are in fact less
than the worst case should be shifted
to the parties who caused the damage.
In addition, there needs to be a system
for reducing the costs in proportion
to any reduction in damages below
the worst case.
For example, a recent study concluded that each acre of coastal wetlands in Louisiana has a present value
to society of approximately $2500$10,000/acre (Farber and Costanza
1987). Increasing the accuracy of the
valuation estimates is an expensive
proposition, and one that would
stress the state's research budget.
To effectively eliminate this trap,
one could charge the parties responsible for marsh destruction (i.e., oil
companies for dredging access canals
through wetlands) the $10,000/acre
worst-case cost. These fees would go
into a trust fund to be used for mitigating environmental damages by
purchasing marshland elsewhere,
backfilling canals, and diverting sediments. The responsible parties could
lower the fee by proving that the
damages are actually less than the
worst-case assumption (by funding
independent studies) or by minimizing the amount of wetlands they damage in the process of accomplishing
their goal (e.g., by directional drilling
or immediate backfilling). In either
case the cause of wetland conservation would be served without unduly
hindering the search for oil and gas.

The arms race and the dollar
auction game
The current arms buildup is an environmental issue both because of its
ongoing resource use and its potential
for massive environmental destruction in the event of a major war
(Mosley 1985, Sivard 1984, Wallace
et al. 1986). Gradual despoilation of
the environment by more conventional means is certainly preferable to
destroying it all at once in a nuclear
war, but both must be included in any
litany of major environmental
problems.
The arms race has been escalating

for the last 40 years and threatens to
continue on this course with new
developments, such as the Strategic
Defense Initiative. It can be argued
that the costs and risks of the arms
race far outweigh its benefits, yet the
process continues with no sign of
abatement.
One simple but enlightening model
for the study of the escalation process
is known as the dollar auction game.
This game is a social trap that was
designed specifically to simulate conflict escalation (Shubik 1971). The
dollar auction is just like a normal
auction except that both the highest
and the second-highest bidder have to
pay the auctioneer their bid at the end
of the game, but only the highest
bidder gets the prize. This rule leads
to some unexpected behavior that is a
useful model of the arms race. Players
in the dollar auction game frequently
bid much more than $1 for a $1
prize-an irrational result that is the
product of a series of "rational" decisions by the bidders, because the
structure of reinforcements in this
game is a trap. If player A had bid $1
and player B had the second-highest
bid at $0.95, player B reasons that if
he drops out he loses $0.95 while if he
raises to $1.05 he only loses $0.05
(assuming he wins the $1 prize). So he
usually raises, and this pattern of
"rational" escalation (beyond the
point where the overall outcome is
rational) continues quite often to well
beyond the $1 point. Individual and
group behavior in the dollar auction
game has been extensively studied by
Teger (1980).
The dollar auction game can be
converted to a trade-off by adding a
"bidding tax" large enough to make
dropping out rational in both the
short run and the long run (Costanza
1984, 1986). For example, if when
player B was at $0.95 he was told that
it would now cost $2 to enter a bid of
$1.05 (a $0.95 bidding tax), he would
reason that if he drops out he loses
$0.95, but if he raises he loses $1 even
if he wins the prize! So the chances
that he would drop out and escape
the trap are increased. This method
has proven to be effective in experiments using the dollar auction game
(Costanza 1986). Extrapolating these
ideas to controlling the escalation of
the arms race is tricky, but it is possible that a nuclear weapons tax (which
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has already been proposed as a method to fund Third World development)
may prove to be an effective control
method (Costanza 1984, 1986, UN
1982).

Conclusions
Social traps are one way of generating
those situations in which the shortterm, local optimizing of individuals
goes afoul. In this sense they indicate
imperfections in the free market approach to resource allocation, which
relies on short-term, local optimizing
of individuals. It can be argued that
the proper role of a democratic government is to eliminate social traps
(no more and no less) while maintaining as much individual freedom as
possible. This can be accomplished
most effectively by turning the traps
into trade-offs that can be handled
within the current market system as
modifications to the cost of potentially entrapping activities.
Social traps abound in environmental issues because of the abundance of
imperfectly owned and common
property resources. To turn these
traps into trade-offs, we must calculate the long-term social cost of activities with environmental impacts and
charge those costs to the responsible
parties in the short run. If there are
any uncertainties about the magnitude of these social costs, the worst
case should be assumed, and the burden of proving that costs are actually
less than this should fall on the parties
responsible for the impact, not the
general public. It is also critical that
short-term incentives for reducing environmental costs (by reducing the
charges) be included. We must make
protecting the environment as economically attractive to individuals in

the short run as it is to society in the
long run.
All animals capable of choice can
be trapped with the right bait. Intelligent ones can learn to avoid traps.
Ingenious ones can even escape from
traps. If we are to survive, we need to
exercise our vaunted intelligence and
ingenuity to see, avoid, and escape
from the many complex traps we
have laid for ourselves.
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